antiquity or at least certain "republican usages" such as Athenian ostracism or Roman censorship. The thrust of Constant's argument exhibits thus very clearly a dichotomy between ancient republicanism and liberalism, a dichotomy that was to feature prominently in the historiography of political thought in general and that can also be profitably demonstrated in the historiography of the American revolutionary and early republican periods.
The historiography of American political thought has drawn on the dichotomy between ancient republicanism and liberalism to a considerable extent, using the two concepts in order to describe the American Founding in terms of a shift in political thought from classical republicanism to modern liberalism. Historians have differed over the question of where to draw the line in the chronology of late colonial and early American political thought, but the integrity of the concepts has never been called into question. While Bernard Bailyn in The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967) had insisted on a minor role for classical republicanism in the founders' political thought, a role confined to providing an indirect source mediated by the British Whig tradition, 12 other historians have followed Gordon Wood in conceding far more weight to ancient republicanism in the revolutionary period, 13 at least up to 1787, when a "transformation" took place "from a republican to a liberal […] culture," 14 where liberty meant personal or private liberty. 15 A few years later, John Pocock further extended the importance of the classical republican tradition into the early national period. 16 Paul Rahe, an ancient historian by education, in his
Republics, Ancient and Modern (1992) , while acknowledging a "mixture of sorts," also remained attached to the dichotomy between "ancient republican" and "modern liberal." 17 A similar description can be given of the historiography of republican thought in general,
showing that the dichotomy between classical republicanism and modern liberalism is at work here too. Indeed, as Stephen Holmes has noted, "the history of modern political theory has recently been reconstructed as a running battle between two supposedly rival traditions: liberalism vs. republicanism." 18 In Quentin Skinner's work, the battle has been reframed as a debate about whether the constitutional framework of a society has a bearing upon the individual liberty of its members, with what Skinner calls the "neo-roman theorists"
maintaining that it does, and their critics, such as Thomas Hobbes and later Isaiah Berlin, that it does not. In Skinner's account, the republican camp has thus been broadened and made to include adherents of all sorts of constitutional arrangements short of absolutism, not just republican writers in a stricter sense. These "neo-roman theorists"-among whom
Skinner counts Harrington, Machiavelli, Milton, More, Nedham, Neville, Sidney-saw individual liberty as conditioned upon the existence of a "free state," drawing upon an analogy between individual freedom as non-slavery and the freedom of states as not being subject to tyrannical rule. 19 But while it is probably correct to interpret Hobbes' conception of liberty as a rather narrow one, Skinner's account is less convincing with regard to his opposition between the so-called neo-roman theorists on the one hand and liberals "after liberalism," such as Benjamin
Constant, on the other. It seems that, although deliberately allowing for a wide range of constitutional make-ups, the writers he calls "neo-roman" are in fact united in terms of a commitment to constitutional safeguards limiting the authority of the government. Skinner does mention this aspect briefly, yet without paying sufficient attention to it; his "neoroman" theorists, in permitting for "a monarch to be the ruler of a free state," surely qualify for being proponents of "self-rule" and liberty only through their commitment to safeguards which bereave the "head of state […] of any power to reduce the body of the commonwealth to a condition of dependence." 20 But if this is so, what distinctly "neo-roman" properties remain? Or, to put it differently, do not these theorists themselves seem to be subscribing to an ideal of liberty "after liberalism" after all? In stressing safeguards and elevating them to the status of necessary and sufficient conditions of liberty, are these writers not in fact giving up on anything distinctly "neo-roman" in favor of the liberal view, shared by Hobbes and Constant, according to which it is not the "source of law but its extent" 21 that matters? If safeguards are key, regardless of the precise constitutional structure surrounding them, it would seem that the distinction between neo-roman and liberal collapses, opening up once again the gap between liberalism, neo-roman or not, and republicanism of the narrow sort which is concerned with participation and self-rule rather than constraints on the sovereign authority.
Thus wherever historians were inclined to draw the distinction, and whatever the differences between the various scholarly approaches described, a belief in the basic dichotomy between ancient republicanism and modern liberalism is common to all of them. The belief seems to rest on two, usually implicit assumptions: first, the assumption that there is such a thing as "ancient republicanism," i.e. that the various versions of classical republicanism and instances of actual republics as evidenced by classical literature, philosophy and historiography can be said to share a sufficient number of properties to make the unifying concept meaningful; and second, the assumption that the concept of liberty as based on individual rights and on constraints on public powers is a distinctly modern idea, liberty after liberalism as it were, paying less attention to self-government but stressing the limits of the "empire of the legislator."
This rough historical picture and the attending dichotomy prove to be too rough-and-ready in terms of historical accuracy and stand in need of differentiation. The reason why the picture has developed in the first place lies, I argue, in too selective a focus in terms of the traditions that came to serve as resources for early modern proto-liberal thought. A certain reorientation, increasingly skeptical of the unifying concept "ancient republicanism" and more sensitive to differentiation, is already visible in the historiography of political thought.
Earlier research that had assumed "classical republicanism" tout court 22 has given way to studies focusing on the substantial differences between Greek and Roman political thought But there is a second tradition that has proved at least as influential, looking not to the mythical Roman republic of Livy's first ten books (covering the years 509 to 292 B.C.), but to texts stemming from the last century of the Roman republic and later. More importantly, the texts used in this second tradition are not so much historical narratives, nor are they especially concerned with analyses of various constitutional or institutional arrangements.
Rather, they are of a normative nature, namely some of Cicero's ethical works and, most importantly, texts from the body of private Roman law contained in Justinian's Digest.
Furthermore, the exponents of what I have called the second tradition were not concerned with political theory strictly speaking; instead they were putting forth ethical theories about the normative conditions obtaining in a state of nature, that is to say theories of natural law.
In developing these theories, the exponents of the natural law tradition referred back to resources providing a rights-based account of rules obtaining both within and without the Roman polity. The state of nature, as conceived by Grotius and his followers, became a domain governed by remedies contained in the Roman praetor's edict and later integrated in Justinian's Digest; these remedies, however, were stripped of their original jurisdictional meaning and turned into substantive rights.
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It is the use of these normative Roman works by the natural law tradition that I wish to tackle in this paper, or rather the use of those works by one pivotal exponent of that tradition, namely Hugo Grotius. Grotius is exceptionally well qualified for this role because not only was he the first of the natural lawyers to develop a fully-fledged account of subjective natural rights, 26 but he also proved to be highly influential in subsequent moral, political, and legal thought. 27 The natural law tradition he shaped was later to endow political theorists of the republican mold with a moral account of a realm outside of or previous to the political, viz. the state of nature, thus providing political theory with a yardstick that made a moral evaluation of the extent of political power-the "empire of the legislator"-possible in the first place. Historically, this combination of the natural law tradition, growing out of the reception of the normative Roman texts mentioned above, with the republican "institutional" tradition led to constitutionalism and the entrenchment of some of the Roman remedies as constitutional rights.
Hugo Grotius' (1583-1645) doctrine of subjective natural rights is thus well suited for our purposes and will serve to rectify the standard historical view on which the dichotomy between classical republicanism and modern liberalism is based. Roman tradition of individual legal remedies which lays claim to a foundational role with regard to Grotius' conception of subjective natural rights.
There are, apart from the fact that Grotius as a humanist lawyer was steeped in Roman law, 33 also two more substantive reasons for this: Roman law had already developed a doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, based on the idea of the sea as having remained in a natural state; the second reason is that Roman law provided a fair amount of commerce driven remedies in contract law, which were part of the so-called law of peoples (ius gentium), a body of law initially created to accommodate foreign people (peregrini), especially merchants, and give them standing in Roman courts. This body of rules-albeit clearly positive Roman law founded upon the praetor's edict-was thought to obtain even beyond Roman jurisdiction and contained remedies granted by the praetor as a matter of equity because they were taken to be furthering some rightful claims. 34 It is not the case, then, that Constant was wrong in identifying a causal relationship between commerce and the development of individual rights-the remedies contained in the ius gentium, which in turn had a distinct impact on Cicero's ethics, were indeed largely commerce driven.
If Constant was right and the concept of individual rights is indeed the defining criterion for the idea of "modern liberty," the Roman lawyers and Cicero have to be seen as satisfying that criterion. Although this paper's focus is not on the Roman texts themselves, but on the use Grotius made of them in some of his early works, the paper does entail some claims about those Roman texts, namely that they contain a concept of subjective rights. While it is true that the Romans did not use one term, such as ius, to express the concept of rights, this is hardly evidence for their lacking the concept. 35 Indeed, an exaggerated fascination with the term "ius" ("right") has held scholarship hostage for some time, exerting a stifling influence. 36 Almost without exception, 37 Grotius used his sources sensibly and sensitively and developed his own work with very close reference to the Roman texts, which justifies the claim that the various terms used in these sources to describe claims and legal remedies were correctly rendered as "rights" by Grotius.
Of the four natural rights that may give rise to a just cause of war-the right to self-defense, to property, to collect debt, and to punish-the right to private property and the right to collect debt are given most attention in this paper, 38 because these two rights are most
intricately tied to what has been acknowledged by liberals such as Constant as a driving force behind the modern concept of rights, that is to say commerce and free trade. 39 The right to punish on the other hand lies beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that Grotius' right to punish is a secondary right of sorts, derivative of the primary rights of selfdefense, property and collection of debt, and designed to prevent these rights from being invaded. 40 The paper will proceed in four sections. The first section gives an account of how Grotius, in his early natural law works, developed a conception of subjective natural rights by reference to Roman law remedies. The second provides a brief discussion of Grotius' right to self-defense and its Ciceronian foundation. Sections three and four deal with the right to private property and the right to enforce contractual claims.
Roman Remedies as Natural Rights
The concept of a state of nature constitutes the foundation of Hugo Grotius' law of nature as well as of his law of nations, both resting on a doctrine of the just causes of war. 41 The legitimate causae belli consist on Grotius' account in a violation of rights inhering naturally in every inhabitant of the natural state, 42 rights which in turn correspond to the natural rights pertaining to the individual in the state of nature according to natural law, and to a certain degree even to individuals in lawfully constituted commonwealths. Grotius' early treatise
De iure praedae commentarius (1604-1606) 43 and its offshoot Mare liberum 44 already contained an inchoate version of such subjective natural rights, and a still more elaborate natural rights doctrine can be found in Grotius' early Theses LVI 45 47 Grotius maintained that the prohibition of navigation and trade imposed by the Portuguese constitutes an injury according to Roman law. 48 If the matter in question between the Portuguese and the Dutch were taken into court, there could be, according to Grotius, "no doubt what opinion ought to be anticipated from a just judge." But if such a judgment cannot be obtained, "it should with justice be demanded in a war." 49 The crucial point to be considered was that, as Pomponius in the Digest had decided, "the man who seized
[usurpere] a thing common to all [res communis] to the prejudice of every one else must be forcibly prevented [manu prohibendus] from so doing." 50 The sea according to Roman law was, along with air and flowing water, precisely such a thing common to all.
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That follows also from an interdict granted by Labeo, cited by Grotius, which is designed to prevent anything from being done in the sea by which shipping could be obstructed. 52 Most importantly, the violation in question does not have to concern just corporeal things, such as an attack on property-rights can be violated as well. The use of common goods (res communes) such as the high seas is exactly such a right that can be defended in a just war. Grotius, true to his Roman law sources, treats the right to use the sea as a quasi-possession under Roman law, 54 in that he treats it as an interest that is, Welwod's attack. 58 In the Defensio, Grotius moved to impute to the Roman lawyers the notion of exactly such a claim-right: 59 Now add the fact that the sea is not only said by the jurists to be common by the law of In De iure praedae, Grotius had still used the term iridescently both in its subjective and its objective sense, but here in the Defensio, Grotius unambiguously attributed a subjective sense to the notion of right, asserting that iuris gentium esse had in fact assumed a subjective sense already in the Digest, 61 and suggesting that the genitive iuris gentium esse is using the term ius in a subjective sense, as in iuris mei esse, in order to be able to present the sea as a subjective "right of nations." Such a subjective interpretation of the formulation mare iuris gentium esse, as it appears in the Digest, is certainly untenable-the only thing the Roman jurists meant by that phrase was that the sea was governed by the rules of the ius gentium. It is not even sure that Grotius himself, when composing De iure praedae, understood the phrase mare iuris gentium in a subjective sense. 62 Not later than with the Defensio, however, this version was convenient for Grotius both because it supported his subjective use of ius in other passages and because it sat comfortably with his rendering of the various actiones and interdicta as rights.
This is one of the very few examples where Grotius, seemingly deliberately, abuses his Roman source material and falsely attributes to the Roman jurists a subjective use of ius gentium as "right of nations" instead of "law of nations." The general thrust of the argument, however, namely that the term "right" (ius) could be used consistently to cover the technical Roman law terms for the various remedies, expresses an important insight into the nature of these remedies-especially given the equitable character of those stemming from ius gentium 63 -which is in any case rather obvious. As Alan Gewirth 64 Subjective natural rights on this account are rights that one can "have," different from the objective norms of law, 70 norms that may restrict the subjective rights bestowed on human beings in the state of nature. 71 The rights vested in the subjects of the law of nature according to the Theses LVI are of a universal character, insofar as they pertain to everyone naturaliter. Moreover, they are rights that can be described as claims in rem in the Roman law sense, insofar as they oblige everybody else to respect these rights. The natural, universal subjective rights in the Theses LVI constitute a quasi-sovereign territory of the individual subject of law in the state of nature, and are an absolute barrier to the claims of all the other subjects of natural law: In concluding the general discussion of ius as subjective right, I submit that subjective rights claims clearly do not hinge on the language of rights and the ius terminology, but must be 79 Grotius formulated as a permissive norm of the law of nature. Moreover, Grotius in the marginal note to his "first law" also referred to Cicero's forensic speech Pro Milone,
The Right to Self-Defense
where Cicero himself, writing in 52 B.C., a time ridden with lawlessness and bound for civil war, had rendered self-preservation as a legal principle. 80 Self-help was lawful in the absence of judicial authority and in a context of diminishing sovereign power, Cicero held, under a "law which is a law not written, but created by nature." 81 In the seventh chapter of De iure praedae, Grotius, setting forth the right to self-defense, drew again on Cicero's Pro Milone. Every just war according to Grotius has its origin in one of four just causes of war, self-defense (sui defensio) being the first of these just causes.
Grotius then justifies self-defense with an argument out of Pro Milone, according to which "the act of homicide is not only just but even necessary, when it represents the repulsion of violence by means of violence." 82 The right to self-defense according to Grotius inheres naturally not only in commonwealths, but also in individuals: "The examples afforded by all living creatures show that force privately exercised for the defence and safeguarding of one's own body is justly employed." 83 Grotius supports this contention with various Roman law passages, the following passage from Florentinus out of the Digest among them:
[It belongs to the law of nations] to repel violent injuries. You see, it emerges from this law that whatever a person does for his bodily security he can be held to have done rightfully; and since nature has established among us a relationship of sorts, it follows that it is a grave wrong for one human being to encompass the life of another. 84 Defense against an unlawful attack constitutes, according to the law of the Digest, a justification for an encroachment on somebody else's rights. Grotius adduces a further passage from the Digest which excepts the bearing of weapons "for the purpose of protecting or carry weapons. 85 Clearly, Grotius' just cause of self-defense is modeled on the notion of self-defense as emerging from the Digest and some of Cicero's works, with the background of Cicero's speech Pro Milone-the civil warlike circumstances of the fading Roman republic with its crumbling institutions-providing the paradigm for Grotius' concept of a natural state, characterized by the absence of judicial organs and the norms of a natural law.
The Right to Private Property
The second of Grotius' so-called "laws" that he expounds in the "Prolegomena" to De iure praedae reads: "It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useful for life." 86 Citing from Cicero's De officiis, Grotius goes on to write:
The latter precept, indeed, we shall interpret with Cicero as an admission that each individual may, without violating the precepts of nature, prefer to see acquired for himself rather than for another, that which is important for the conduct of life. 87 Grotius explains that among the ancient schools of philosophy there had been unity in this regard, backing up this contention with a reference to Cicero's portrayal of the various ethical doctrines in De finibus. 88 In Mare liberum (chapter twelve of De iure praedae), Grotius explains the origin of the institution of private property by paraphrasing Cicero's explanation of the acquisition of private property in De officiis, an explanation that is based on the Roman law concept of long occupancy (vetus occupatio). 89 In the "Prolegomena," Grotius writes that use of certain things requires the acquisition (apprehensio) and possession (possessio) of these things, and that hence the institution of private property (dominium) had originated. 90 In the marginal note, Grotius refers to a passage by Paulus out of book 41 of the Digest, where the origin of private property is traced back to "natural possession," i.e. the acquisition of possession of an unowned thing ab initio. 91 Grotius' is an account of private property that does not take private property to be an original institution of natural law, but, once constituted, private property is protected by the natural legal rules-there are, on Grotius' view, principles of natural justice governing property holdings. Property, then, is not constituted by government. 92 This is very similar to Cicero's account in De officiis, 93 although it seems that both Cicero and the account in book 41 of the Digest in fact presuppose the notion of private property as an institution rather than explaining its origin, and explain merely the acquisition of private property.
Grotius holds that the institution of private property is not the result of a sudden decision, but was brought about by slow change that started under the guidance of nature (monstrans natura). 94 There are certain things, Grotius writes, which are consumed by use, a fact making it impossible to distinguish between use and property. 95 Grotius predicates this view on a passage of the Digest, where usufruct (ususfructus) of money and other consumables is being dealt with. 96 With regard to these things, the usufructuary under Roman property law becomes the full owner. The thing belongs to him in an exclusive way, belonging to nobody else at the same time-the concept of private property as the most comprehensive right somebody can have in a thing is therewith formulated. This concept was then, according to
Grotius, extended to clothes and gradually to immovable things. 97 As the institution of private property had thus been "invented" (reperta proprietas), the law codifying that institution was stipulated in order to "imitate nature." 98 Private property, then, is on Grotius'
account an institution of the state of nature, perfectly possible apart from civil society and government. Although not existing by nature, the institution nevertheless came into being in a natural way. Grotius adduces the famous theater analogy, which originally stems arguably from Chrysippus, 99 property by occupation, i.e. a right to the possibility of being a property-owner, 106 and not a general right to private property as such. It would be correct to describe Grotius' right to actual property as a special right, 107 having come into being by virtue of certain contingent transactions, and giving the right-bearer an exclusive, absolute right in rem against everyone else, while only his right to be eligible to acquire property could be adequately described as a general right in rem inhering in every human being ab initio.
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The process of acquisition itself, or rather the normative principles that apply to that process, are not Grotius' main concern. The distribution of property is left largely to coincidence. Among Chrysippus' many neat remarks was the following: "When a man runs in the stadium he ought to struggle and strive with all his might to be victorious, but he ought not to trip his fellow-competitor or to push him over." Indeed, in an earlier passage Cicero had maintained that men had sought protection in cities "in the hope of safeguarding their property" and that political communities and polities were "constituted especially so that men could hold on to what was theirs," 118 which led him to express particular concern about property taxes (tributum).
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Grotius clearly is an important element of that property-centered tradition of a "historical,"
"entitlement theory of justice." 120 Natural justice with regard to the original distribution of property is both in Cicero and in Grotius not predicated on the justness of the result of the distribution, but exclusively on the procedure governing the distribution. Only this procedure must be compatible with natural law in order for the original distribution of property to qualify as legitimate. 121 Grotius does not endeavor to argue morally for his preference of procedural over result-oriented natural justice, which is the obvious conceptual consequence of Grotius' developing a theory of the origin of the institution of private Unlike private property, which in De iure praedae is not originally natural, the power or right to one's action is-as in the Theses LVI-a natural institution in the strict sense. Both actions and private property, however, can be alienated according to De iure praedae, which extends the commerce friendly aspect of the right to private property to one's own actions, and, in De iure belli ac pacis at the latest, to one's own person and body. 129 Breaches of contract constitute, like violations of property rights, just causes of war. Grotius derives this formally from his sixth so-called law that "Good deeds must be recompensed." 130 Substantively, however, Grotius derives this just cause of war from the necessary condition for just war under the Roman fetial law (ius fetiale) that redress be demanded (rerum repetitio). Grotius attaches importance to the statement that breach of contract gives rise to an independent just cause of war, substantiating his claim by reference to the fetial formula handed down by Livy:
A third cause [of just war]-one that a great many authorities neglect to mention-turns upon debts arising from a contract or from some similar source. To be sure, I presume that this third group of causes has been passed over in silence by some persons for the reason that what is owed us is also said to be our property. Nevertheless, it has seemed more satisfactory to mention this group specifically, as the only means of interpreting that well-known formula of fetial law: "And these things, which ought to have been given, done or paid, they have not given, paid or done." that may give rise to rights in another subject. 139 These transactions are clearly modeled upon the Roman consensual contracts (obligationes consensu contractae) as described by Gaius, 140 where an agreement, entirely free of form, is enough to produce enforceable contracts.
Conclusion
Why does it matter that Grotius' doctrine of natural rights was influenced by and dependent upon certain Roman law remedies and the attending political theory? I suggest that there are three ways in which it matters: First, and maybe most importantly, the account given of the various rights Grotius is prepared to vest in the subjects of the natural law and the Roman background of these rights, if correct, adds historical data to our present-day interpretation of such rights. The historical account given can therefore contribute to a better doctrinal understanding of Grotius' natural rights, and, to the extent that Grotius proved influential, to a better understanding of modern doctrines of constitutional and human rights; if we want to inquire into the natural lawyers' conceptions of various natural rights from Grotius onwards, I suggest that we will have to look to the Roman jurists' travaux préparatoires, as it were, in order to gain a precise sense of those conceptions. In this sense, such a doctrinal elucidation might even contribute to the debate over the correct interpretation of liberalism as a whole, in that it can provide us with additional arguments for the doctrine-arguments taken from the Roman background that are maybe not explicitly mentioned in the early modern texts-which may enhance the doctrine's soundness.
Second, if the claims made in this paper are historically accurate, and Grotius did in fact use
Roman law and Cicero because-quite apart from the pragmatic reasons that caused Grotius to use those sources-these texts provided him both with a concept of subjective rights and with detailed rules for a natural, non-political sphere, then we have reason to believe that the Romans, in their political and legal thought, developed a concept of subjective rights and the natural exercise and acquisition thereof which is much more akin to liberal conceptions of rights than Roman institutional history alone would make us believe. 141 The view about
Grotius' close use of certain Roman sources defended in this paper implies obviously a view about those Roman sources, casting doubt on Benjamin Constant's sweeping claims about the nature of ancient and modern liberty. 142 Third, an account like the one given in this paper, by showing us which tradition we are in fact part of, might help us identify some of the contingent features of that tradition-a vital prerequisite for any subsequent normative assessment of the tradition. This is of course not to say that an historical account in itself could ever vindicate or discredit any normative claim; it is just to say that such an account may serve to raise our sensitivity to the possibility that some of the normative claims we hitherto intuitively thought to have epistemic reasons to believe are merely the contingent product of some particular historical circumstance-which obviously does not exclude the possibility that, upon renewed normative scrutiny, taking into account the historical data, we still deem those claims valid.
As an example for the third way in which the account may matter, consider the upsetting impact it potentially has on traditionalist ethics. To wit, Constant's historical claim has appealed not only to rights friendly liberals such as Isaiah Berlin, but also to nostalgic adherents of a "back to Aristotle" ethics such as Michel Villey or Alasdair MacIntyre. 143 Probably most explicitly in MacIntyre's Thomist case for communitarianism, that historical claim has been made to carry some philosophical weight. According to MacIntyre, modern, that is to say post-enlightenment, rights-based ethics is internally incoherent because it is composed of poorly understood residua of the Aristotelian tradition, a diagnosis which in MacIntyre's view makes a return to Aristotelian ethics inevitable. 144 The inevitability of such a return to Aristotle results from MacIntyre's traditionalist relativism, a position that acknowledges a concept of the good only in relation to a given tradition and therefore relies on an historical account of that tradition, hence making itself vulnerable to historical criticism. MacIntyre does not claim that we should go back to an Aristotelian ethics because it is better tout court (this argument is not open to him), but because it provides a coherent foundation of the tradition, however poorly understood, we happen to be part of. An historical account like the one offered in this paper that denies our rights-based ethics this genealogy must therefore undermine MacIntyre's argument by his own lights. 145 There are thus considerable ramifications of Grotius' use of and dependency on a Roman tradition in developing his doctrine, since it seems to suggest that some of the crucial features of modern liberalism such as deontological individual rights were in fact derived explicitly, and with good reason, from a Roman tradition. The lessons to be drawn from such an account of Grotius' doctrine of rights, then, are both of a conceptual and an historical nature. Conceptual in that this account of Grotius' doctrine of rights suggests that anything deserving the label "negative liberty" seems difficult to conceive of without a notion of subjective rights, and historical in that it may direct the ongoing search for the origins of modern rights-based moral, political, and legal thought towards the normative texts of Roman law and Roman ethics. In the Greek city-states, "the concept of freedom gained political importance [in the context] of the community's defense against foreign rule and tyranny," and was thus understood collectively. In Rome, by contrast, libertas had a "primarily negative orientation," and was "almost without exception-for aristocrats and commoners alike-protection against (excessive) power, force, ambition, and arbitrariness." In Rome, the freedom concept was focused "on the needs of individual citizens," and "its function was markedly negative and defensive," and was "linked primarily with individual rights that eventually were fixed by law." It is of course this last aspect that provides the link to the tradition which is the subject of this paper. 29 Which is why only a small part of Aristotle's theory of justice, namely compensatory justice, is imposed on a polis-less natural state that is far more susceptible to the normative sources of Roman origin, which place little emphasis on distribution. 
